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There can be no doubt that the adoption of s. 24(2) of our Charter1 brought about a 
profound change in the manner in which Canadian courts viewed the admissibility of 
illegally obtained evidence. The decisions of those courts, and especially of the 
Supreme Court of Canada, have been the subject of much discussion and debate by 
academic commentators, the media and, no doubt, all Canadians who take an interest 
in the administration of criminal justice in this country.
The starting point for any discussion of the principles applicable to the exclusion 
of evidence in criminal trials must be the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in R. 
v. Wray1, a decision which predated the Charter by some eleven years. The impugned 
evidence in Wray consisted of parts of a confession made by the accused to the police, 
which was later found to have been involuntary, and an item of what we would now 
refer to as “derivative evidence”. The derivative evidence consisted of a gun found by 
the police as a result of the accused’s involuntary statement. The Crown sought to 
admit both the gun and those parts of the involuntary confession which were 
corroborated by other evidence. The accused resisted the admission of this evidence 
on the ground that its admission would tend to bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute.
Justice Martland wrote the reasons of the majority. He held that the impugned 
evidence should be admitted and expressed the view that a judge has no discretion to 
exclude admissible evidence on the basis that its admission would be calculated to bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute.
Nevertheless, the majority of the Court acknowledged that a judge has a limited 
discretion to exclude evidence to ensure a fair trial. The scope of this discretion was, 
however, exceedingly narrow. Justice Martland held that trial fairness is compromised
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(and the evidence may be excluded) only where “the allowance of evidence [is] gravely 
prejudicial to the accused, [its] admissibility is tenuous and [its] probative force . . .  
trifling”. Otherwise, it was held that “the allowance of admissible evidence relevant to 
the issue before the Court and of substantial probative value may operate unfortunately 
for the accused, but not unfairly"?
Three justices dissented, expressing the view that the repute of the administration 
of justice is properly the concern of judges. This position is perhaps best encapsulated 
in the reasons of Justice Spence, who held:
I am most strongly of the opinion that it is the duty of every judge to guard against 
bringing the administration of justice into disrepute. That is a duty which lies upon him 
constantly and a duty which he must always keep firmly in mind. The proper discharge 
of this duty is one which ... is of paramount importance to the continued life of the 
state.4
I think it is safe to state that the views expressed by the minority in Wray ultimately 
carried the day. When the Charter was adopted in 1982, it contained s. 24(2) which 
clearly and unequivocally empowers judges to exclude evidence where the admission 
of this evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The legislative 
history of this provision makes it clear that section 24(2) of the Charter was envisaged 
as a sort of “compromise” between the very narrow rationale for exclusion set out in 
Wray and the almost automatic rule of exclusion in force in the United States.5
The question of when evidence will bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute is a very difficult one to answer. Will the administration of justice be brought 
into disrepute only where the evidence is obtained so wrongfully as to “shock the 
conscience” of the community, or will the admission of any evidence which was 
illegally obtained threaten the integrity of our system of justice? Is the answer to be 
found somewhere in between? These are questions about which reasonable members 
of the public may, and often do, disagree. Nevertheless, they lie at the very heart of the 
rules which have been developed in relation to section 24(2) of the Charter.
In R. v. Collins,6 the Supreme Court of Canada made its first serious attempt to 
answer these difficult, yet so very important, questions. Justice Lamer (as he then was) 
identified a catalogue of factors to be weighed in determining whether evidence should 
be excluded pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter. These factors include the kind of 
evidence obtained and whether it was otherwise discoverable, the nature of the right 
breached, the seriousness of the violation, good faith (or its absence) on the part of the
'Ibid. at 293 [emphasis added].
4Ibid. at 304.
5Stuart, supra note 1 at 453-54 and 475-77.
6[1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 [hereinafter Collins],
police, the seriousness of the offence and the importance of the evidence to the Crown’s 
case.
Justice Lamer then proceeded to divide these factors into three categories: those 
relating to the fairness of the trial, those relating to the seriousness of the Charter 
breach and those relating to the effect of excluding the evidence on the repute of the 
administration of justice. These categories have come to be known as the three 
“branches” of the Collins “test”.
With respect to the first branch of the test, the so-called trial fairness branch, Justice 
Lamer held that the nature of the evidence is a very important factor. He concluded that 
“real evidence that was obtained in a manner that violated the Charter will rarely 
operate unfairly for that reason alone; the real evidence existed irrespective of the 
violation of the Charter and its use does not render the trial unfair.”7 These words 
unfortunately led to some confusion in later decisions.
Justice Lamer also held that “the situation is very different where, after a violation 
of the Charter, the accused is conscripted against himself through a confession or other 
evidence emanating from him.”8 In such cases, an unfair trial will often be the result. 
This statement clearly shows that the trial fairness branch of the Collins test is primarily 
concerned with “self-incriminating” or “conscriptive” evidence.
In cases where the admission of the evidence would not adversely affect the fairness 
of the trial, Justice Lamer held that a judge ought to go on to consider the seriousness 
of the Charter breach and the effect of excluding the evidence on the repute of the 
administration of justice. In doing so, however, the Courts are not to consider 
themselves bound by the results of public opinion polls. On the contrary, Justice Lamer 
adopted the test suggested by Professor Morissette of McGill University: “would the 
admission of the evidence bring the administration of justice into disrepute in the eyes 
of the reasonable man, dispassionate and fully apprised of the circumstances of the 
case?”9
Without a doubt, Justice Lamer’s reasons in Collins went a long way toward 
settling the principles applicable to section 24(2) of the Charter. Nevertheless, 
uncertainty remained on several key points.
First, there was some disagreement as to the proper application of the trial fairness 
branch of the Collins test. In the years after Collins, a consensus emerged that the 




Justice Lamer stated in Collins that “rear  evidence obtained in violation of the Charter 
will rarely render the trial unfair. Does this mean that so-called real evidence cannot 
also be conscriptive evidence? If not, what precisely do we mean by the expression 
conscriptive evidence?
Second, how do we decide if evidence is conscriptive? Will it be conscriptive 
whenever the accused is forced to participate in its creation or discovery, or is 
something more required?
Third, what role does the concept of discoverability play in the trial fairness 
analysis? Will evidence be considered discoverable whenever it could have been 
discovered without the unlawful conscription of the accused or only where it would 
have been discovered in the absence of a Charter breach?
Fourth, what is the effect of finding that certain evidence is conscriptive and would 
therefore tend to render the trial unfair? Must this evidence of necessity be excluded 
or may it be saved if the breach was not serious or if the exclusion of the evidence 
might tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute?
Finally, how should courts go about determining whether a breach is sufficiently 
serious to warrant the drastic remedy of exclusion? What is the significance of a 
finding of good or bad faith on the part of the police? What does “good faith” mean in 
the context of s. 24(2) of the Charter?
In R. v. Stillm an,the Supreme Court of Canada has attempted to both clarify and 
simplify the principles applicable to the adjudication of applications for the exclusion 
of evidence on Charter grounds. In doing so, it has attempted to answer at least some 
of the questions posed.
In view of the recency of Stillman, as well its relevance to s. 24(2) applications, I 
intend to make this decision the focus of my discussion of the principles applicable to 
s. 24(2) of the Charter.
II. Trial Fairness and R. v. Stillman
(a) Facts
The facts of Stillman are very troubling, from every perspective. The accused, a young 
offender, was charged with the brutal murder of a teenage girl in New Brunswick. 
Semen was found in the victim’s vagina and a human bite mark was found on her 
abdomen. The cause of death was a wound or wounds to the head.
10[1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 [hereinafter Stillman].
Upon his arrest, the accused retained counsel. His lawyers met him at RCMP 
headquarters. The police indicated that they wished to take hair samples and teeth 
impressions and to question the accused. The accused spent two hours with his lawyers. 
At the end of the meeting, the lawyers provided the police with a letter indicating that 
the accused refused to provide any bodily samples whatsoever or to give any 
statements. However, as soon as the lawyers left, the police proceeded to take samples 
of the accused’s scalp hair and forced him to pull some of his pubic hair. Plasticine 
teeth impressions were also taken.
A constable proceeded to interrogate the accused for approximately one hour. 
Although the accused did not say anything, he sobbed throughout the interview. The 
interview came to an end when the accused asked once again to telephone his lawyer.
While waiting for his lawyer to arrive, the accused used the washroom. Upon 
leaving, he blew his nose and threw the tissue in a waste bin. The tissue was seized and 
subsequently used for DNA testing.
When the accused’s lawyer returned to the headquarters, he objected to the actions 
taken by the RCMP. Again the lawyer left, and again the RCMP tried to get a statement 
from the accused. The accused was released from custody five days later when the 
Crown expressed the view that there was not enough evidence to proceed to trial.
Several months later, after they had received the DNA and dental analysis, the 
RCMP again arrested the accused, in part to allow them to take better impressions of 
his teeth. A dentist attended at the RCMP detachment and, in a procedure which lasted 
more than two hours, took impressions of the accused’s teeth without his consent. More 
hair was taken from the accused, as well as saliva samples and buccal swabs.
Two issues fell to be decided by the Supreme Court of Canada. First, were the 
tissue or bodily samples validly seized pursuant to the common law power of search 
incidental to arrest? Since the scope of this common law power is not the topic of this 
paper, I shall not refer in any detail to this part of the judgment. The majority of the 
Court held that the seizure of these items was unlawful. Second, should the items 
seized in violation of the Charter nevertheless be admitted pursuant to section 24(2)? 
It is this part of the reasons which is pertinent for the purposes of this discussion
(b) The Majority Decision
i) Effect of a finding of trial unfairness
The Court first considered the trial fairness branch of the Collins test. It will be 
remembered that one of the outstanding questions after Collins was whether evidence 
the admission of which would render the trial unfair must always be excluded, or 
whether it could nevertheless be admitted if the Charter breach was not serious, or
where exclusion may bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The majority 
of the Court expressed the view that such evidence must always be excluded. No free 
and democratic society can countenance an unfair trial. As the majority held in 
Stillman, “a conviction resulting from an unfair trial is contrary to our concept of 
justice; to uphold such a conviction would be unthinkable; it would indeed be a travesty 
of ju s t i c e 1 Therefore, where the impugned evidence fails the trial fairness branch of 
the Collins test, in other words where the admission of the evidence would render the 
trial unfair, the evidence must be excluded, without reference to the other Collins 
factors.
ii) What kind of evidence will render a trial unfair? — The conscriptive/non- 
conscriptive distinction
What kind of evidence will render a trial unfair? The majority of the Court held that the 
answer to this question lies in the distinction between two categories of evidence: 
conscriptive and non-conscriptive. The admission of non-conscriptive evidence will 
rarely render the trial unfair. Therefore, if a judge properly characterises evidence as 
non-conscriptive, he or she should generally move on to consider the other two 
branches of the Collins test.
Conscriptive evidence, however, is an entirely different kettle of fish. If evidence 
is characterized as conscriptive then, unless it can be said to be discoverable, its 
admission will generally render the trial unfair. Non-discoverable conscriptive evidence 
must therefore always be excluded.
But, what is the difference between conscriptive and non-conscriptive evidence? 
As a starting point, it is imperative to understand where the answer to this question does 
not lie. The answer does not lie in the distinction between testimonial and real 
evidence. It may be thought by some that real evidence, which refers to anything which 
is tangible and exists as an independent entity, can never be conscriptive evidence. This 
view is, with the greatest respect, mistaken. Whether evidence should be characterized 
as conscriptive or non-conscriptive has nothing whatsoever to do with whether it also 
happens to be real evidence. As the Court held in Stillman, the characterization of 
evidence as real evidence, simpliciter, is irrelevant to the s. 24(2) inquiry. For this 
reason, it may be better to drop altogether the expression real evidence in the s. 24(2) 
context. The relevant question is not “is the evidence ‘real’ evidence”, but rather, “is 
the evidence conscriptive or non-conscriptive”.12
"Ibid. at para. 72 [emphasis added]. 
i:See supra note 1.
This begs the question: what is the difference between conscriptive and non- 
conscriptive evidence? The majority of the Court defined conscriptive evidence as 
follows: “evidence will be conscriptive when an accused, in violation of his Charter 
rights, is compelled to incriminate himself at the behest of the state by means of a 
statement, the use of the body or the production of bodily samples”.13 All other 
evidence is non-conscriptive evidence.
It may be helpful to break this definition down to its constituent elements. First, in 
order to be conscriptive, the evidence must have been compelled by the state from the 
accused. Therefore, where the accused provides the evidence voluntarily, the evidence 
will not be conscriptive. An accused may simply choose to provide a statement or other 
evidence. Also, unbeknownst to him, the accused’s statement may have been captured 
by a wiretap or some other recording device, prior to his being detained. This evidence 
can not be said to be compelled and is therefore not conscriptive.
Second, the compulsion must have resulted from a Charter breach. Where, for 
example, the accused is forced to provide evidence pursuant to a valid warrant, there 
will be no Charter breach. The evidence will therefore not be conscriptive, even though 
it was compelled from the accused. Likewise, evidence compelled from the accused by 
a person who is not an agent of the state will not be considered conscriptive.
Third, not all evidence compelled from the accused in violation of the Charter will 
be classified as conscriptive evidence. This label attaches only to three very specific 
kinds of evidence: statements, the use of the body and bodily samples as evidence. The 
first of these, statements, is self-explanatory. Where the accused is forced, in violation 
of the Charter, to make a statement, the statement will be conscriptive and, if it is not 
discoverable, can not be admitted at the trial. This situation usually arises in cases 
where the accused provides a statement as a result of a breach of his right to counsel.
“The use of the body as evidence” will occur in cases such as R. v. Ross and 
Leclair,™ where the accused were forced, in violation of their Charter rights, to 
participate in a police line up. They were thereby forced to allow their bodies to be 
used as evidence for identification purposes.
Finally, bodily samples consist of parts of an accused’s body, such as hair or blood 
samples, teeth impressions or buccal swabs, taken from him in violation of the Charter.
An alternative approach to conscriptive evidence would be to classify any evidence 
discovered as a result of the forced participation of the accused as conscriptive. Thus, 
if the police force the accused to produce the contents of his pocket, the items seized
11Stillman, supra note 10, at 655.
l4[ 1989] 1 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Ross and Leclair].
would be classified as conscriptive simply because they could not have been seized 
without the forced participation of the accused This approach is not the one followed 
in Stillman. On the authority of Stillman, the items seized from the accused’s pocket 
would not be classified as conscriptive evidence. Although these items may well have 
been compelled from the accused in violation of the Charter, they do not consist of 
statements, bodily samples or the use of the body as evidence, and hence are not 
conscriptive. Of course, whether they would be admitted in evidence would depend 
upon the other Collins factors.
The majority of the Court arrived at this conclusion for two principle reasons. First, 
the Court took the position that the body is the outward manifestation of a person. A 
bodily sample certainly tells us something very personal about the accused in a manner 
similar to a statement. It “emanates from the accused”, to use the language in Collins. 
Indeed, bodily samples, in some respects, have a certain testimonial quality to them. 
Second, the majority of the Court considered it to be of paramount importance to 
emphasize the sanctity and integrity of the human body. As the majority held in 
Stillman:
Any invasion of the body is an invasion of the particular person. Indeed, it is the 
ultimate invasion of personal dignity and privacy ... . The concept offairness requires 
that searches carried out in the course of police investigations recognize the importance 
of the body.15
Furthermore, the majority of the Court expressly rejected the idea that the sanctity 
of the body should be relevant only with respect to the “seriousness of the breach” 
branch of the Collins test. Such an approach fails to recognize the fundamental 
importance of the innate dignity of the individual. That dignity is violated if individuals 
are prevented from exercising their free will as to the use to be made of their own body 
by agents of the state. Furthermore, the security of the body is just as worthy of 
protection from state intrusion aimed at compelled self-incrimination as are statements. 
Therefore, bodily samples obtained by a significant compelled intrusion upon the body 
without consent and in violation of the Charter will be considered to be conscriptive.
So far then, it is clear that statements and bodily samples compelled from the 
accused, and the compelled use as evidence of the body, in violation of the Charter, will 
be classified as conscriptive evidence. Is this the only evidence which should be 
classified as conscriptive? The answer is -  not exactly.
iii) A subset of conscriptive evidence: derivative evidence
In Stillman, the majority of the Court recognized a subset of conscriptive evidence 
called “derivative” evidence. Derivative evidence is evidence (usually tangible 
evidence) which is found as a result of conscriptive evidence provided by the accused. 
In other words, the conscriptive evidence must be a necessary cause of the discovery 
of the derivative evidence.
An example of derivative evidence is provided by the case of R. v. Burlingham.16 
There the accused gave a full confession, in violation of his right to counsel. This 
confession was therefore conscriptive evidence. As part of his statement, the accused 
told the police that the murder weapon could be found at the bottom of a frozen river. 
The murder weapon, a gun, was ultimately seized from the river. There is no way that 
the police could have found the gun without the conscripted statement. Because the 
conscripted statement was the necessary cause of the discovery of the gun, the gun was 
classified as derivative evidence, which is a logical subset of conscriptive evidence.
Thus, the first step in the trial fairness analysis is to classify the evidence either as 
conscriptive evidence, which includes derivative evidence, or as non-conscriptive 
evidence. If the evidence is classified as non-conscriptive, its admission will generally 
not render the trial unfair and the judge should go on to consider the other Collins 
factors. On the other hand, if the evidence is conscriptive, then, unless it is 
discoverable, its admission will render the trial unfair. Therefore, if one classifies 
evidence as conscriptive, one must go on to the second step in the trial fairness analysis: 
discoverability.
iv) Discoverability
The admission of conscriptive evidence will not always render the trial unfair. Indeed, 
in recent cases, and again in Stillman, it was held that the admission of conscriptive 
evidence will not render the trial unfair where the impugned evidence would have been 
discovered in the absence of the unlawful conscription of the accused.
The rationale for this rule is straightforward. The purpose of any Charter remedy 
must be to place the person whose rights were violated, usually the accused, in the 
position in which he would have found himself had his rights not been breached.17
Let us take the example of the gun in Burlingham. There is simply no way that the 
gun would ever have been found if the Charter had not been violated. Excluding the
16[1995] 2 S.C.R. 206 [hereinafter Burlingham].
17Professor Kent Roach elaborates upon this rationale in his article entitled “The Evolving Fair Trial Test 
under Section 24(2) of the Charter” (1996) 1 Can. Crim. L. R. 117.
gun is therefore the only way to undo the breach by putting the accused in the same 
position as that in which he would have found himself had the breach never taken place.
However, let us change our example somewhat. Let us assume that the gun was 
hidden, not at the bottom of a frozen river, but in the accused’s dresser drawer. 
Furthermore, let us assume that, while the accused was being interrogated in violation 
of the Charter, other police officers were preparing to search the accused’s home. 
Finally, let us assume that the Crown succeeds in demonstrating, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the gun would have been found during the ensuing search. In that 
situation, the gun would have been found even without the unlawful conscription of the 
accused. If there had been no conscriptive statement, the gun, once found, would no 
doubt have been admitted as evidence. Therefore, if the gun is excluded, the accused 
is placed in a better position as a result of the conscriptive Charter breach than that in 
which he would have found himself had the breach not occurred. The discoverability 
principle is designed to ensure that this kind of overcompensation does not take place.
When will evidence be discoverable? Evidence will be discoverable where the 
Crown proves, on a balance of probabilities, that it would have been discovered. There 
are two ways in which the Crown may discharge its burden. First, it may establish that 
there was an alternative non-conscriptive means through which the state would have 
obtained the evidence. The second situation where discoverability will be made out is 
where the evidence would have inevitably been discovered. R. v. Black18 provides an 
excellent illustration of the notion of inevitable discovery.
The position of the majority of the Court in Stillman may therefore be summarized 
as follows. For the purposes of the trial fairness branch of the Collins test, evidence 
must be classified as either conscriptive or non-conscriptive. Conscriptive evidence 
consists of compelled statements and bodily samples and the compelled use of the body 
as evidence in violation of the Charter. It also includes evidence derived from this 
evidence (usually from a statement). Evidence derived from this evidence (what the 
Court calls derivative evidence) is evidence, such as the gun in Burlingham, which 
would not have been found in the absence of the conscriptive statement. All other 
evidence is non-conscriptive.
If evidence is classified as non-conscriptive, its admission will generally not render 
the trial unfair. The judge should therefore go on to consider the other branches of the 
Collins test, namely the seriousness of the breach and the effect of exclusion on the 
repute of the administration of justice. On the other hand, if the evidence is 
conscriptive, the trial judge must go on to consider whether it nevertheless would have 
been discovered by alternative non-conscriptive means. If the conscriptive evidence 
was discoverable, its admission will not tend to render the trial unfair and the judge 
should go on to consider the other Collins factors. If the conscriptive evidence was not
discoverable, its admission will render the trial unfair. It fails the first branch of the 
Collins test and must be excluded without reference to the other Collins factors.
The majority of the Court provided the following summary of the principles 
elucidated in Stillman:
1. Classify the evidence as conscriptive or non-conscriptive based upon the 
manner in which the evidence was obtained. If the evidence is 
now-conscriptive, its admission will not render the trial unfair and the court will 
proceed to consider the seriousness of the breach and the effect of exclusion on 
the repute of the administration of justice.
2. If the evidence is conscriptive and the Crown fails to demonstrate on a balance 
of probabilities that the evidence would have been discovered by alternative 
non-conscriptive means, then its admission will render the trial unfair. The 
Court, as a general rule, will exclude the evidence without considering the 
seriousness of the breach or the effect of exclusion on the repute of the 
administration of justice. This must be the result since an unfair trial would 
necessarily bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
3. If the evidence is found to be conscriptive and the Crown demonstrates on a 
balance of probabilities that it would have been discovered by alternative 
non-conscriptive means, then its admission will generally not render the trial 
unfair. However, the seriousness of the Charter breach and the effect of 
exclusion on the repute of the administration of justice will have to be 
considered.
Applying this test to the facts before it, the majority of the Court held that all the 
impugned evidence except the discarded tissue had to be excluded. The bodily samples 
were compelled from the accused in violation of sections 7 and 8 of the Charter and 
were therefore conscriptive evidence. Furthermore, they were not discoverable, since 
at the time no warrant procedure was in place pursuant to which they could have been 
seized. Since this evidence was conscriptive and not discoverable, it would, if admitted, 
render the trial unfair. Exclusion was therefore the inevitable conclusion.
The tissue, on the other hand, was not compelled. Furthermore, even if it were 
compelled, it was discoverable. The police could have obtained a warrant to seize it. 
Admitting the tissue would not render the trial unfair. Furthermore, a consideration of 
the other Collins factors: the seriousness of the breach and the effect of exclusion on the 
repute of the administration of justice, militated in favour of admission.
While the majority approach in Stillman has been the subject of criticism by some 
academic writers,19 even critics acknowledge the clarity it has brought to the s.24(2) 
analysis.
(c) The Dissenting Opinions
The three dissenting judges in Stillman would have admitted all the evidence. Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé concluded that the seizures were validly carried out pursuant to the 
common law power of search incident to arrest and, therefore, there was no breach of 
the Charter.
Justice McLachlin took issue with the majority on two main points. First, she 
expressed the view that the definition of conscriptive evidence adopted by the majority 
of the Court was overly broad and not supported by the common law. Justice 
McLachlin would have preferred restricting conscriptive evidence to testimonial 
evidence, such as a confession. Bodily samples, in her view, ought not be classified as 
conscriptive but simply as real evidence existing independently of the Charter breach.
Second, Justice McLachlin took issue with the majority’s conclusion that evidence 
the admission of which tends to render the trial unfair must always be excluded. She 
noted that s. 24(2) requires that “all the circumstances” must be considered before 
evidence is excluded. In her view, this requirement means that all the Collins factors 
must be considered, even if trial fairness is detrimentally effected. She held that there 
may well be instances where admission of conscriptive evidence might be an “unfair 
aspect” of a trial without necessarily rendering the trial “fundamentally unfair”.
Applying these considerations to the facts of Stillman, Justice McLachlin held that 
she could see no basis upon which to interfere with the exercise by the trial judge of his 
discretion and would have admitted the evidence.20
The reasons of the majority in Stillman focused on the principles applicable to the 
first branch of the Collins test. However, the second branch of the test has also been 
the subject of close scrutiny by the Court.
19See, for example, D. M. Paciocco, “Stillman, Disproportion and the Fair Trial Dichotomy under s. 24(2)” 
(1997) 2 Can. Crim. L.R. 163; D. Stuart, “Stillman: Limiting Search Incident to Arrest, Consent Searches and 
Refining the Section 24(2) Test” (1997) 5 C.R. (5th) 99.
“ Justice Gonthier concurred with both Justice L’Heureux-Dubé and Justice McLachlin.
III. Seriousness of the Breach: R. v. Silveira1'
In a recent case, the Supreme Court considered the factors applicable to the “seriousness 
of the breach” branch of the Collins test. This case involved an unreasonable search of 
a dwelling place.
The police entered the accused’s dwelling house and conducted a warrantless 
search. They then remained in the home until other officers arrived with a warrant, at 
which point they conducted a more thorough search and seized certain evidence. This 
search was held to have violated s. 8 of the Charter. None of the evidence seized was 
conscriptive in nature.
In assessing the seriousness of the Charter breach, the majority of the Court applied 
the factors elaborated in R. v. Strachan,22 namely:
• was the violation inadvertent or committed in good faith or was it wilful, 
deliberate and flagrant?;
• was the violation serious or merely of a technical nature?;
• was the violation motivated by a situation of urgency or necessity?;
• were there other investigative means available to the police which would not 
infringe the Charter?23
The majority of the Court affirmed that any violation of the privacy of a person’s 
home will tend to be extremely serious. However, other factors mitigated the 
seriousness of the Charter violation.
The majority specifically found that there was a reasonable basis for the trial 
judge’s finding that exigent circumstances justified the police entry into the home of the 
accused. The public nature of the arrest of the accused (which took place prior to the 
search) would likely have tipped off the occupants of the dwelling house to the 
imminent arrival of the police. It was therefore imperative to search the house as soon 
as possible after the arrest. Furthermore, although the police initially had no warrant, 
there is no doubt that reasonable and probable grounds existed which would have 
justified the issuance of a warrant. Finally, the manner in which the search was carried 
out was reasonable.
21[1995] 2 S.C.R. 297 [hereinafter Silveira],
22[ 1988] 2 S.C.R. 980.
23Silveira, supra note 21 at 367.
On the issue of good faith, the majority held that:
If there was no specific finding that the police had acted in good faith, there was 
certainly no indication that there was any evidence of bad faith on the part of the police. 
Further, the evidence reveals that the police considered that they had the right to enter 
the house to preserve the evidence and an able and experienced trial judge appeared to 
agree with that conclusion. The trial judge, like the police, may have been in error in 
reaching that conclusion for the police actions specifically breached the provisions of 
s. 10 of the Narcotic Control Act. Nonetheless, the circumstances of the public arrests 
and the need to preserve the evidence were found to constitute exigent circumstances.
In those circumstances, it cannot be said that the breach o f the Charter rights by the 
police was committed in bad faith.24
Finally, the majority of the Court held that, although the police had successfully 
invoked exigent circumstances, they should be on notice that exigent circumstances 
will, as a general rule, not excuse them in the future from compliance with the warrant 
requirements set out in the Criminal Code:
the Charter should not be used as a matter of course to excuse conduct which has in the 
past been found to be unlawful. This case has confirmed that to enter and search a 
dwelling-house without a warrant constitutes a very serious breach of the Narcotic 
Control Act and the historic inviolability of a dwelling place. Therefore, in the future, 
even ifsuch exigent circumstances exist, the evidence would likely be found inadmissible 
under s. 24(2). It is difficult to envisage how the admission of the evidence could not 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute since in subsequent cases, it will be 
very difficult for the police to claim that they acted in good faith if they entered the 
dwelling without prior judicial authorization. The police must now know that exigent 
circumstances do not provide an excuse for failing to obtain a warrant.25
In my view, it is clear from Silveira that an unreasonable search of a dwelling house 
will generally be considered to be a very serious violation of the Charter. While the 
good faith of the investigating officers may be a factor mitigating the seriousness of the 
breach, Silveira has put those investigating crimes on notice that “exigent 
circumstances” would henceforth rarely justify the violation of Charter rights.
IV. Effect of Exclusion on the Repute of the Administration of Justice
The third branch of the Collins test has no application where evidence has properly been 
found to be conscriptive and not discoverable. Such evidence must be excluded without 
regard to the other Collins factors. The admission of conscriptive and non-discoverable 
evidence would render the trial unfair. Allowing an unfair trial would without a doubt
24Ibid. at 368-69 [emphasis added].
25Ibid. at 374 [emphasis added]. Justice La Forest dissented. He would have excluded the evidence on 
seriousness grounds.
bring the administration of justice into disrepute in the eyes of the reasonable person. 
Therefore, admitting conscriptive and non-discoverable evidence would tend to bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute. If the evidence fails the first branch of the 
Collins test, it must also fail the third.
However, if the evidence is not conscriptive, or if it is conscriptive and 
discoverable, one must go on to consider both the second and third sets of Collins 
factors. A consideration of the third set of factors cannot, however, be divorced entirely 
from a consideration of the second. The more serious the Charter breach, the more 
likely it will be that the admission of the evidence will bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. However, if the breach is of a minor or technical nature, it may 
well be that excluding the evidence would being the administration of justice into 
greater disrepute than admitting it.
However, it should be recalled that the seriousness of the offence will not always 
be a factor militating in favour of the admission of the evidence. Indeed, as Justice 
Iacobucci held in Burlingham, “even a person accused of the most heinous crimes, and 
no matter the likelihood that he or she actually committed those crimes, is entitled to the 
full protection of the Charter.”26
V. R. v. Feeney21 : An Overview
The accused in Feeney had been convicted by a jury of the murder of an 85 year old 
man. The morning after the murder, the investigating officer decided to approach the 
accused in his “dwelling house” which consisted of a windowless trailer. The officer 
did not have a warrant.
The officer knocked on the door of the trailer. When he received no reply, he 
entered with his gun drawn and found the accused sleeping. The officer woke the 
accused and asked him to get up and move into a better light. The officer noticed blood 
spattered all over the front of the accused. He arrested the accused and had another 
officer read the accused his rights. This Charter warning was later found to be 
deficient.
The accused made several inculpatory statements and provided fingerprints and a 
breath sample, all of which the Crown sought to have admitted in evidence. The Crown 
also sought to introduce the bloody shirt, a pair of shoes, cigarettes and cash seized by 
the police in the accused’s trailer.
Supra note 16 at 242.
27[ 1997] 2 S.C.R. 13 [hereinafter Feeney].
Apart from the breath samples and the inculpatory statements the trial judge 
dismissed the accused’s application for the exclusion of this evidence. The Court of 
Appeal unanimously dismissed the accused’s appeal. The majority of the Supreme 
Court took a different view of the matter.
Justice Sopinka, with whom La Forest, Cory, Iacobucci and Major JJ. concurred, 
held that all the impugned evidence must be excluded. The inculpatory statements and 
the fingerprints were classified as conscriptive evidence, as that expression was defined 
in Stillman. Because this evidence was not discoverable, its admission rendered the trial 
unfair. This evidence was therefore excluded without reference to the other Collins 
factors.
On the other hand, the bloody shirt, cigarettes, shoes and cash were classified as 
non-conscriptive, because they did not consist of statements, bodily samples or the use 
of the body as evidence. Furthermore, because the unlawfully obtained statements were 
not a necessary cause of the discovery of these items of evidence, they could not be 
classified as derivative evidence. It was therefore held that the admission of this 
evidence would not render the trial unfair, and the Court went on to consider the other 
Collins factors.
Justice Sopinka held that the violations of the accused’s rights were very serious. 
The investigating officer had testified that he did not believe that he had reasonable and 
probable grounds to arrest the accused at the moment he entered the trailer. This 
absence of a subjective belief in reasonable and probable grounds in itself warranted the 
conclusion that the police were not acting in good faith. As well, it was found that at 
the relevant time there were no reasonable and probable grounds, in an objective sense.
Justice Sopinka rejected the Crown’s argument that the evidence ought to be 
admitted since it was discoverable. The Crown had pointed out that the police could 
simply have waited for the accused to come out of the trailer later in the day and 
observed the bloody shirt from outside. However, it was held that the existence of 
alternative legal means for obtaining the evidence rendered the Charter breach more 
serious, not less so. On this point, Justice Sopinka held that:
The respondent argued that the evidence of the bloody shirt would have been discovered 
in any event, stating in its factum (para. 69): “The police could have waited outside the 
trailer until the appellant eventually came out. At that time they would have observed 
the blood stains on him unless he had destroyed that evidence.” The respondent 
assumes that the appellant would walk out in broad daylight with blood stains on his 
shirt. In my view, this suggestion is unrealistic. Moreover, the appellant need not have 
destroyed the evidence on the shirt in order to avoid displaying it in public, but simply 
could have stored the shirt in the trailer. In any event, the availability o f alternative 
constitutional means to discover the shirt does not mitigate the seriousness o f the 
violation even if  such means did exist. As Lamer J. (as he then was) stated in Collins, 
supra at p. 285, “the availability of other investigatory techniques and the fact that the 
evidence could have been obtained without the violation of the Charter will tend to
render the Charter violation more serious.” I f  other techniques were indeed available, 
it is demonstrative o f bad faith and is particularly serious that the police chose to 
violate the appellant’s rights.28
Finally, Justice Sopinka held that the potential destruction by the accused of the 
evidence did not constitute an “exigent circumstance” excusing the violation of the 
accused’s rights:
The respondent also argued that there were exigent circumstances in this case, which, 
according to R. v. Silveira ... may be a relevant consideration in a s.24(2) analysis. As 
discussed above, in my view exigent circumstances did not exist in this case any more 
than they would exist in any situation following a serious crime. After any crime is 
committed, the possibility that evidence might be destroyed is inevitably present. To 
tend to admit evidence because o f the mitigating effect o f such allegedly exigent 
circumstances would invite the admission o f  all evidence obtained soon after the 
commission o f a crime. In my view, there were no exigent circumstances in this case 
that mitigated the seriousness of the Charter breach.29
In light of the seriousness of the Charter breach and the disrepute to the justice 
system that would have resulted from the admission of the evidence, the majority of the 
Court excluded the evidence and ordered a new trial.30
VI. Feeney, Silveira and s. 24(2) of the Charter
The discussion in the main part of this paper of the “seriousness of the breach” branch 
of the Collins test focused principally upon the reasons of the majority in Silveira. It 
will be recalled that, in Silveira, evidence seized pursuant to the unlawful search of a 
dwelling house was admitted under s. 24(2). The majority found that there was strong 
and persuasive evidence to support the trial judge’s finding that there were exigent 
circumstances that mitigated the seriousness of the Charter breach. Nevertheless, the 
police were placed on notice that, “after this case it will be rare that the existence of 
exigent circumstances alone will allow for the admission of evidence obtained in a 
clear violation of... s. 8 of the Charter,”31
Silveira and Feeney clarify several principles relevant to the interpretation of s. 
24(2) of the Charter.
2HIbid. at para. 70 [emphasis added].
29Ibid. at para. 73 [emphasis added].
,0Lamer C.J. and L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and McLachlin JJ. would have admitted the evidence. In their
view, the violations were not serious and the exclusion of the evidence would bring the administration of 
justice into greater disrepute than would its admission.
First, when read together, these cases make it clear that an unreasonable search of 
a dwelling house will generally be considered to be a very serious violation of the 
Charter. As the majority held in Silveira:
It is hard to imagine a more serious infringement of an individual's right to privacy. The 
home is the one place where persons can expect to talk freely, to dress as they wish and, 
within the bounds of the law, to live as they wish. The unauthorized presence of agents 
of the state in a home is the ultimate invasion of privacy. It is the denial of one of the 
fundamental rights of individuals living in a free and democratic society. To condone 
it without reservation would be to conjure up visions of the midnight entry into homes 
by agents of the state to arrest the occupants on nothing but the vaguest suspicion that 
they may be enemies of the state. This is why for centuries it has been recognized that 
a man's home is his castle.32
Second, the two judgments discuss the meaning of the expression “good faith” in 
the context of s. 24(2) of the Charter. While the good faith of the investigating officers 
may be a factor mitigating the seriousness of the breach, it will be almost impossible 
to demonstrate good faith where the officers did not even have a subjective belief in the 
reasonableness of the search or arrest.
Furthermore, even where police officers believe that they are acting lawfully, they 
cannot be said to be in good faith where that belief is mistaken and where they ought 
to have known that their conduct was improper. Thus, in R. v. Kokesch, it was held 
that:
The police must be taken to be aware of this Court’s judgments in Eccles and Colet, and 
the circumscription of police powers that those judgments represent.
Either the police knew they were trespassing, or they ought to have known. Whichever 
is the case, they cannot be said to have proceeded in “good faith”, as that term is 
understood in s. 24(2) jurisprudence.33
Justice Sopinka cited this passage with approval in Feeney. He held that the police 
could not be said to have acted in good faith because “in this case, as in Kokesch, the 
police knew they were trespassing or ought to have known.”34
Finally, in Feeney, the Court once again considered the notion of “exigent 
circumstances”. Although Justice Sopinka did not pronounce upon whether exigent 
circumstances could ever excuse the unlawful search of a dwelling house, he held that, 
in any event, “exigent circumstances” must mean more than the situation of urgency 
which follows any violent crime. He observed that:
nIbid. at 367.
” [1990] 3 S.C.R. 3 at 32 [hereinafter Kokesch].
24Supra note 27 at para. 189.
After any crime is committed, the possibility that evidence might be destroyed is 
inevitably present. To tend to admit evidence because of the mitigating effect of such 
allegedly exigent circumstances would invite the admission of all evidence obtained 
soon after the commission of a crime.35
This cautious approach to the notion of “exigent circumstances” is consistent with 
Silveira. In Feeney, the real possibility of the destruction of evidence did not constitute 
an “exigent circumstance” and was found not to mitigate the seriousness of the Charter 
breach.
VII. Conclusion
The Court attempted in Silveira and, more recently, in Stillman, to clarify some of the 
more difficult issues arising out of its post -Collins jurisprudence. Issues such as the 
definition of conscriptive evidence, and how it differs from non-conscriptive evidence, 
the nature of derivative evidence, the role of discoverability and the effect of a finding 
of trial unfairness on the admissibility of evidence have, it is hoped, been clarified, at 
least to some degree.
The Court was told in oral argument that many aspects of the Collins test, at least 
as it had come to be interpreted, were unduly complex both from the point of view of 
the practitioner and the judge. There can be no doubt that one very important aim of 
Stillman was to provide a clear path for all to follow.
The importance of the sanctity of the body was stressed. It was emphasized that 
any removal of a bodily substance must be carried out in accordance with lawful 
statutory provisions and the principles of fundamental justice.
The Criminal Code now provides that the police may in certain circumstances 
secure a warrant to seize bodily samples. It was observed that:
Although the issue was not raised it would seem that the recent provisions of the Code 
permitting DNA testing might well meet all constitutional requirements. The procedure 
is judicially supervised, it must be based upon reasonable and probable grounds and the 
authorizing judge must be satisfied that it is minimally intrusive. It cannot be forgotten 
that the testing can establish innocence as readily as guilt as the Guy-Paul Morin case 
so vividly demonstrates. It seems to me that the requirement of justification is a 
reasonable safeguard which is necessary to control police powers to intrude upon the 
body. This is the approach that I would favour.36
-'Ibid. at para. 194.
,hStillman, supra note 10 at 660.
In Silveira, the primordial importance of privacy within the home was emphasized. 
Any breach of s. 8 which occurs in a dwelling house will generally be considered to be 
very serious indeed.
